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H.B. 248: SERVICE To PERSONS OUTSIDE OF OHIO IN DIVORCE,
ANNULMENT, AND ALIMONY ACTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

House Bill 248 amended Ohio Revised Code section 3105.06' to
permit service by publication in a divorce, annulment, or alimony action where the defendant "is not a resident of this state or is a resident
of this state but absent from the state."' Under previous law there was
no authorization, either in the Ohio Revised Code or the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure, to allow such service. Furthermore, there was no expressed authorization for any kind of service on such defendants in
divorce and annulment actions.3 The Family Law Committee of the
Ohio State Bar Association recommended that section 3105.06 be
amended to remedy this statutory infirmity.4 This recommendation
formed the basis of H.B. 248,' which became law on June 7, 1979.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Background: The Problem and Its Origin

Before the enactment of H.B. 248, a unique situation existed in
Ohio law relating to service of process in divorce and annulment actions. On the face of the law there was no conceivable means for obtaining effective service in these actions upon defendants outside the
state. This predicament can be traced to the 1968 Modern Courts
Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. The amendment granted
authority to the Ohio Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure.'
Any rules promulgated pursuant to this authority take priority over
1.

Amended House Bill 248, 113th General Assembly (1979), codified at OHIO
§ 3105.06 (Page Supp. 1979). In its amended form the section reads:
If the residence of a defendant in an action for divorce, annulment, or alimony is
unknown, or if the defendant is not a resident of this state or is a resident of this
state but absent from the state, notice of the pendency of the action shall be given
by publication as provided by the rules of civil procedure.
2. Id.
3. See OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(8).
4. Report of the Family Law Committee, 51 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 386 (1978).
5. H.B. 248, with a few minor exceptions, was a word for word adoption of the
committee's recommendation. Among the changes made that were not in the recommendation was the change of the word "must" to "shall." This apparently is to clarify
that service by publication is not mandated. Section 3 of the bill was also added,
declaring the act to be an emergency provision.
REV. CODE ANN.

6.

See

OHIO CONST.

art. IV, § 5.

7. See Mulligan & Pohlman, The 1968 Modern CourtsAmendment to the Ohio
Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L. J. 811, 829 (1968).
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any law conflicting with them.' Through the enactment of this amendment, it was hoped that the disorganization previously existing in this
area would be remedied. 9
In accordance with the 1968 amendment, the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure were promulgated. Upon the adoption of these rules in
1970, the General Assembly passed H.B. 1201 in order to remove from
the books all laws in conflict with the new civil rules.' 0 Although
technically unnecessary," the enactment was intended to aid in the
elimination of confusion.'" While H.B. 1201 may have been a step
toward this goal, it nevertheless generated certain problems of its own.
Even though hundreds of sections were deleted from the code, the
mass repeal left standing some potentially conflicting sections.' 3 More
significantly, many provisions which were repealed by H.B. 1201
should have been left standing." Among those sections indiscriminately
repealed was the former Ohio Revised Code section 3105.06. " The latter portion of that section, dealing with the technical requirements of
service by publication, could not stand consistently with the rules.' 6
But the first segment of section 3105.06, concerned only with authorizing service by publication, was probably consistent with the new pro7
cedural guidelines.'
The necessary implication of repealing section 3105.06 was that
there could be no service by publication in any divorce, annulment, or
alimony action." The error was soon recognized 9 and, in response,
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5.
9. Mulligan & Pohlman, supra note 7.
10. Amended House Bill 1201, 108th General Assembly (1971) repealed approximately 350 sections of the Ohio Revised Code. See OHIO R. Civ. P. appendix A (Page
1971); Pucket, Effect of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure on Existing Statutes, 29
OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 835, 838 (1970). Although section 3 of H.B. 1201 contained a savings clause whereby a court could revive a repealed section, this clause has been used
sparingly. See generally Brown, Civil Rule 1 and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to
the Resolution of Conflicts Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
363 (1978).
11. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra. See also Lasher, The Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure and Their Effect on Real Property Titles, 4 AKRON L. REV. 47
(1971).
12. See Lasher, supra note 11.
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id.
15. Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.06 (Baldwin 1964).
16. Under that law, when the address of the defendant was reasonably ascertainable, along with publication a summons had to be mailed to his last known address.
Rule 4.4 dispenses with the dual service requirement.
17. Because H.B. 248 essentially reenacts that portion, a view to the contrary
would necessarily mean that H.B. 248 is also inconsistent with the rules.
18. This is true because, under rule 4.4, any service by publication must be
"authorized by law."
19. See Lasher, The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and Their Effect on Real
8.
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the General Assembly reenacted section 3105.06 in part. 0 On its face,
however, the reenacted version of section 3105.06 sanctioned service
by publication only where the defendant's address was unknown. 21
Under a literal interpretation of the section in conjunction with the
civil rules, service by publication could never be achieved in divorce,
annulment, or alimony actions upon an out-of-state defendant, so long
as his address was known. This is because rule 4.4 authorizes service by
publication only when authorized by law. Because section 3105.06 did
not authorize service by publication when the address of the defendant
was known, such service could not be utilized under the language of
rule 4.4.22
More significantly, there was no apparent authorization, either in
the statutes or in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, for any type of
service on out-of-state defendants in divorce and annulment actions.
Rule 4.3(A), which enumerates the actions in which Ohio courts are
vested with long arm jurisdiction, makes no mention of divorce or annulment actions. 23 The exclusion of divorce and annulment actions
from this enumeration indicates, by negative implication, that Ohio
courts have no long arm jurisdiction in such actions absent some independent jurisdictional basis.24 Despite this lack of authorization in
the statutory scheme, out-of-state defendants continued to be served,
both by the methods prescribed in rule 4.3(B) and rule 4.6, and by
publication. 5
B.

H.B. 248: Correction of the Problem
H.B. 248 basically represents an attempt to conform the statutory

Property Titles, 4 AKRON L. REV. 47, 73 n.73 (1971).

20. House Bill 602, 109th General Assembly (1971).
21. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.06 (Page 1972).
22. Report of the Family Law Committee, supra note 4.
23. Rule 4.3(A)(8) deals with actions arising out of living in the marital relationship within the state. Although it allows service in actions involving alimony, custody,
child support, or property settlements, it does not authorize it for divorce or annulment actions in general.
24. See Report of the Family Law Committee, supra note 4. At least one commentator, however, saw rule 4.3(A)(8) as an expansion of Ohio's long arm jurisdiction
to a broader range of cases. See Wilson, Service of Process, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 487
(1970). But any suggestion that there is some common law authority for service in
divorce actions is somewhat flawed. "Divorce, of course, is entirely a statutory
matter." Haun v. Hoffman, 145 Ohio St. 31, 32, 60 N.E.2d 657, 658 (1945).
25. See OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM 81, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 15RACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL
RULES, 4.09 (1973). This manual is used as a guide in the clerk's office of the Common
Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Domestic Relations Division. The fact that in
practice service was nonetheless made on out-of-state defendants was confirmed by
Don Bolsinger, who is chairman of the Family Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar
Association. Telephone interview with Don Bolsinger (December 19, 1979).
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scheme to the dominant practice and to correct the error made by the
General Assembly eight years ago.", Superficially, the new law
authorizes service by publication on out-of-state defendants in divorce,
annulment, and alimony actions. This appears consistent with the civil
rules, in that rule 4.4(B) empowers the legislature to determine when
service by publication is "authorized by law."" But, again, the implications of H.B. 248 are of greater significance than what may be
gleaned from the language of the statute.
The plaintiff who, by virtue of section 3105.06, falls within the
purview of rule 4.4(B) is bound procedurally to initially utilize the
other methods of service provided for in that rule before he may resort
to service by publication. 8 Thus, when service is to be effected on a
nonresident, or on a resident absent from the state, 29 rules 4.3(B) and
4.6(C)(D) must be utilized before service by publication is permissible.
Consequently, service by certified mail and ordinary mail, which had
not previously been expressly sanctioned under rule 4.3(A), 3" are now
authorized by the new section 3105.06, in conjunction with rule 4.4(B).
This is true even though there is no mention of these process options in
the new law itself, nor any indication in rule 4.3 that Ohio's long arm
jurisdiction can be extended in this manner.
C. Procedure Under the New Law
The enactment of section 3105.06 may prove confusing to the legal
community for a variety of reasons. First, because H.B. 248 is intended
to conform the written law to the dominant practice, it may confuse
those in the legal community who had proceeded under the old law as
though out-of-state service in divorce and annulment actions were
sanctioned by the statute. 3' Thus, for the majority of the legal community, there is no obligation to alter their practice, even though the
written law has changed. Others, being unfamiliar with the
peculiarities of Ohio law, may fail to comprehend the critical interrela26. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
27. OHIo R. Ov. P. 4.4(B).
28. Id.
29. Rule 4.4(B)(1) speaks in terms of "residents" while rule 4.4(B)(2) deals with
the category of nonresidents. Although residents absent from the state may appear to
fall under rule (B)(1), it is more consistent with other rules to view them the same as
nonresidents. This is true because rule 4.3 treats nonresidents and residents absent
from the state as falling within the same category.
30. This may in some cases also be true for personal service. See OHIO R. Civ. P.
4.3(B)(2).
31. Representative Terry Tranter, the chief sponsor of the bill, indicated that the
Act has already created a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding. Telephone
conversation with representative Terry Tranter (November 13, 1979).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/14
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tionship between section 3105.06 and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The attorney who views section 3105.06 in isolation will attempt to effect service by publication without first complying with the
prerequisites set out in rule 4.4(B). This will result in invalid service.
Conversely, an attorney viewing the civil rules without making the
necessary cross-reference to section 3105.06 may mistakenly determine
that the defendant cannot validly be served.
By way of illustration, consider the plaintiff's counsel who wishes
to obtain service of process on his client's nonresident spouse. He will
first seek service by certified mail under the long arm jurisdiction of
rule 4.3. In most situations, paragraph (A)(8) will be the only portion
32
of rule 4.3 relevant in determining the validity of this option. Two
apparent circumstances will prevent the plaintiff from proceeding
under this rule. First, if the claim did not arise from the parties living
in the marital relationship within Ohio, there can be no service under
rule 4.3(A)(8). Second, if there is no issue of "alimony, custody, child
settlement," rule 4.3(A)(8) provides no long arm
support or property
33
jurisdiction.
In the event that one of the above circumstances exists, the plaintiff will have encountered his first procedural obstacle. This, however,
does not constitute an insurmountable roadblock, despite the conspicuous absence of any language in rule 4.3(A) suggesting other circumstances in which the procedures in rule 4.3(B) might be employed.
Having failed to obtain long arm jurisdiction through rule 4.3(A),
counsel for plaintiff should attempt to proceed under one of the other
civil rules. Rule 4.6 authorizes service by ordinary mail, but only when
35
personal, residential, 3' or certified mail service has been refused, or
3 6 These opwhen certified mail has been unclaimed by the defendant.
tions, however, are of no avail at this juncture because the conditions
precedent cannot be fulfilled. 37
While scrutinizing rule 4.6, counsel may find some indication that
his resources have not yet been exhausted. Rule 4.6(A), dealing with
limits of service of process, provides that service outside the state may
32. The other paragraphs of rule 4.3(A) in most situations will have no application. There may, however, be exceptions, such as if the ground for divorce is some tortious act. See OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(3).
33. But see note 24 supra.
34. Residential service is a method that can be utilized inside the state. OHIO R.
Civ. P. 4.1. Under rule 4.3, however, it has no application as to out-of-state service.
35. OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.6(C).
36. Ofio R. Civ. P. 4.6(D).
37. Because certified mail could not be attempted above, it could not be refused
or unclaimed within the language of rule 4.6.
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be authorized either by the rules or by law. This puts plaintiff's
counsel on notice that he must search both the civil rules and the Ohio
Revised Code to ascertain the limits of service of process in Ohio. If
counsel refers to rule 4.4 to determine the viability of service by
publication as an alternative, he will encounter further reference to the
statute. Under rule 4.4(B), service by publication can only be effected
when it is authorized by law. Having exhausted all other options under
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff is now relegated to the
statutes to determine if the General Assembly has exercised its authority
in the area. Upon consulting the Ohio Revised Code, plaintiff's
counsel will find several sections relating to service by publication.3 8
Among these is section 3105.06, dealing with such service in divorce,
annulment, and alimony actions.
Under section 3105.06, as amended by H.B. 248, plaintiff is
authorized to serve defendant by publication, as provided in rule
4.4(B). Rule 4.4(B), however, requires that other forms of service be
attempted before service by publication may be utilized. Rule 4.4(B)(2)
mandates that in the case of a nonresident, service must first be attempted under rule 4.3(B), and then under rule 4.6(C) or (D). Thus,
section 3105.06, rather than merely permitting service by publication,
further operates to open up the other service alternatives provided for
by the rules. The plaintiff may now proceed under rule 4.3(B). If he is
unsuccessful, he may proceed under the appropriate subsection of rule
4.6. If this fails, he may then effect service by publication.
D.

Consistency of H.B. 248 with the Civil Rules

There is little doubt that the procedure illustrated above was contemplated by the proponents in H.B. 248.11 There may be some question, however, whether H.B. 248 can stand consistently with rule 4.3.
It could be argued that rule 4.3(A) provides the only situations in
which service of process may be resorted to under rule 4.3(B). As
stated above,"0 the authority to promulgate rules of procedure rests
with the Ohio Supreme Court. Any statutes conflicting with the rules
are automatically superseded. 4' 1 By promulgating rule 4.3(A) the Ohio
Supreme Court intended to "set out the minimum contacts sufficient
to vest Ohio courts with long arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." '4 2 It would logically follow that, absent some authorization in
38.

ANN. §§ 2703.14, 2733.11 (Page 1954); OHIO REV.
§ 3111.22 (Page 1972); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.24 (Page Supp.

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE

CODE ANN.

1979).
39. See Report of the Family Law Committee, supra note 4.
40. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
41. Id.
42. Schatel v. Weitz, 40 Ohio App. 2d 95, 97, 318 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1974).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/14
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the rules, any attempt by the legislature to further extend long arm
jurisdiction is contrary to that intent. Rule 4.3 contains no such
language delegating authority to the General Assembly. It might also
be contended that rule 4.3(A) operates as a restriction on rule 4.4(B),
thereby mandating that any out-of-state service "authorized by law"
must also be authorized by 4.3(A). Furthermore, to allow a statutory
extension of the long arm jurisdiction conferred by rule 4.3(A)
frustrates the purpose of the 1968 Ohio Modern Courts Amendment in
eliminating the confusion which existed in prior law by vesting
3
rulemaking authority in one body.'
If a court of law were to find the above arguments persuasive, the
validity of H.B. 248 would be in serious doubt. Such an interpretation
would import that rule 4.3(A) would serve as the sole means of attaining long arm jurisdiction under rule 4.3(B). The authorization clauses
of rules 4.4 and 4.6 could not operate as an alternative route. Because
H.B. 248 draws its authority from these clauses, this would initially
mean that no out-of-state service by certified mail could be utilized
under rule 4.3(B). This would, in turn, prevent use of ordinary mail
under rule 4.6(C) and (D). The end result would be the legal impossibility of compliance with the language of rule 4.4(B), which
restricts the use of service by publication to instances where service
cannot be effected by other methods." Furthermore, sanctioning service by publication, without first requiring use of other methods,
would run afoul of due process guarantees.' The fourteenth amendment in effect mandates that the method of service utilized be that
which, among those methods reasonably practicable under the circumstances, is most likely to reach the defendant.' 6 Service by publication is generally viewed as the least satisfactory method.' 7
In all probability, however, section 3105.06 will be viewed as consistent with the civil rules. While there is no authorization in rule 4.3
itself for the legislature to provide for other situations in which out-ofstate service may be authorized, the authorization clauses of rules
4.4(B) and 4.6(A) appear to be broad enough to legitimize H.B. 248. It
is also important to note that the reference in rule 4.4(B) is specifically
to rule 4.3(B), rather than to rule 4.3 in general.' 8 This indicates that
43. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
44. Rule 4.4(B) makes the use of other forms of service a condition precedent to
any use of service by publication. If no other type of service were authorized, that condition precedent could not be met.
45.
46.
47.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 (2d ed. 1979).

48. By contrast, the reference to rule 4.1 in rule 4.4(B)(1) is not to a specific section of that rule. If the authors of the rules intended rule 4.3(A) to operate as a restricPublished by eCommons, 1980
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service is to be made by the method provided in rule 4.3(B), without
reference being made to rule 4.3(A). By this approach, there are two
distinct routes to qualify for service under rule 4.3(B); one being rule
4.3(A) and the other being rule 4.4(B).
This approach is supported further by rule 4.6(A), which provides
that "when authorized by law or these rules" a defendant may be served
outside the state."' Thus, it is clear that the rules were not intended to
prohibit the legislature from authorizing service outside the state. Furthermore, the existence of other statutes allowing service by publication in other areas indicates that the procedure utilized by H.B. 248 is
proper.5" It should also be noted that prior to the enactment of H.B.
248 out-of-state service was commonly used on defendants in divorce,
annulment, and alimony actions. In light of this consideration, the
codification of this customary practice should not generate any
measurable criticism from within the legal community. 5
III.

CONCLUSION

Before the enactment of H.B. 248, there was no statutory support
for the common practice of serving out-of-state defendants in divorce
and annulment actions. While H.B. 248 resolves this inconsistency, it
may consequentially cause confusion in its own right. Not only may
the less experienced practitioner be perplexed by the confusing interrelationship between section 3105.06 and the civil rules, but even the
veteran domestic relations attorney may have difficulty understanding
that while the written law has changed, he is under no concomitant
obligation to alter his previous practices. Despite these expected problems, the enactment of H.B. 248 was necessary to erase a legislative
mistake made by the General Assembly nearly a decade ago and to
conform the written law with generally accepted practices for effecting
service of process.
Stephen A. Watring
Code Section Affected: 3105.06.
Effective Date: June 7, 1979.
Sponsor: Tranter (H).
Committee: Judiciary (H).
tion on rule 4.4(B), they certainly could have more clearly indicated that intent through
use of a more general reference.
49. OHIQ R. Civ. P. 4.6(A).
50. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.14 (Page 1954). Many of the actions
enumerated in this section are not directly within the scope of rule 4.3(A). See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.14(A), (E)-(G) (Page 1954).
51. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss2/14

